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Abstract It remains unclear if patients with different types of common mental
disorders, such as adjustment, anxiety and depressive disorders, have the same
irrational ideas. The aim of this prospective cohort study (n = 190) is to investigate
differences in level and type of irrational beliefs among these groups and to examine
whether a change in irrational beliefs is related to symptom recovery. Irrational
beliefs (IBI) and symptoms were measured at four points in time: at baseline, after
3, 6 and 12 months. Results showed that diagnostic groups differed in their level of
irrational beliefs and this effect remained over time. Highest levels of irrationality
were observed in the double diagnosis group, followed by the anxiety disorder
group and the depression group. Participants with adjustment disorders showed the
lowest levels of irrationality, comparable to a community sample. We did not ﬁnd
differences in the type of irrational beliefs between diagnostic groups. The level of
irrationality declined over time for all diagnostic groups. No differences in decrease
were observed between diagnostic groups. The magnitude and direction of change
in irrational beliefs were related to the magnitude of recovery of depressive, anxiety
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DOI 10.1007/s10942-007-0075-0and stress symptoms over time. These results support the application of general
cognitive interventions, especially for patients with a depressive or an anxiety
disorder.
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Introduction
In recent years, cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) has been applied to a broad
variety of patient groups and settings. It is advocated as the therapy of choice for
common mental disorders, such as anxiety and depressive disorders, by the
Department of Health of the UK (Department of Health 2001). The cognitive
component of CBT is based upon the notion that irrational cognitions play a key
role in the development and maintenance of emotional disturbances (Beck 1976;
Ellis 1977). According to this theory, emotions are not wholly determined by
environmental events but rather, negative emotions are enhanced by irrational
cognitions, which magnify the intensity of the situation at hand. For example, the
prominent model of Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT) in cognitive
therapy postulates that excessive negative emotions are the result of irrational
beliefs such as ‘‘I must absolutely not fail, I cannot tolerate failing’’. Within the
framework of cognitive therapy, symptom recovery is achieved by disputing these
irrational beliefs and replacing them with more adaptive rational cognitions (Ellis
1995). Reviews of the efﬁcacy of REBT have shown that it is an effective treatment
(e.g., Engels et al. 1993; Lyons and Woods 1991).
For clinical reasons, it would be relevant to know whether patients with different
types of common mental disorders, such as adjustment disorders, anxiety and
depression, are equally irrational. Irrationality may differ in many aspects. Patients
with one disorder may endorse an overall higher level of irrational beliefs than
patients with other disorders. Knowledge of the level of irrationality in different
diagnoses could provide clinicians with clues as to which patients could potentially
beneﬁt most from cognitive interventions. Furthermore, patients with different
diagnoses may endorse different types of irrational cognitions. Such information
would generate indications of which irrational ideas should be addressed during
CBT. Finally, irrational beliefs may be more persistent in certain disorders. Along
with the level of irrationality, persistency of irrationality over time could be an
indicator of the severity of the problem of irrationality in certain disorders. For
clinicians, such knowledge could inform their choice of intensity of their treatment
for certain diagnostic groups.
One might expect patients with less severe disorders to have lower level of
irrational beliefs compared to patients with more severe disorders. Within the group
of common mental disorders adjustment disorders are considered less severe than
depressive and anxiety disorders in terms of the DSM-IV classiﬁcation (APA 1994).
However, we do not know of any empirical evidence of a difference in level of
irrationality between adjustment disorders and depressive or anxiety disorders. In
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123non-clinical populations, the level of irrationality has been studied in relation to
different symptoms. Several studies have found that level of irrational beliefs are
associated with depressive symptoms (Chang and Bridewell 1998; Chang 1997;
Kassinove and Eckhardt 1994) and anxiety symptoms (Malouff 1992). Support for
differential effects of level of irrationality and speciﬁc symptoms is scarce. Chang
(1997) found that level of irrational beliefs was related to depressive symptoms, but
not to life stress. Moreover, Chang and Bridewell (1998) found that a higher level of
irrational beliefs was found in students with depressive symptoms compared to
students with anxiety symptoms. In conclusion, there is a need for evidence of a
relation between severity of the disorder and the level of irrational beliefs that
comes from research in clinical populations.
Although the relationship between irrational beliefs and negative feelings is a
core component of REBT, the exact impact of irrational beliefs on emotion has not
yet been clariﬁed (David et al. 2005). It remains unclear whether speciﬁc irrational
beliefs lead to speciﬁc symptoms and speciﬁc disorders, as opposed to the
possibility that any irrational belief is capable to trigger any symptom. For instance,
emotional irresponsibility (attributing emotions to external causes rather than to
oneself) can be hypothesised to trigger depressive symptoms especially. Another
example might be that worrying is mainly linked to anxiety symptoms. Although
common mental disorders may have symptoms in common, the core negative
feelings associated with the disorders differ. Therefore, if the content of irrational
beliefs is linked to the content of the symptom one would expect patients with
different common mental disorders to have different types of irrational beliefs.
The question whether patients with different common mental disorders endorse
different types of irrational beliefs has, to our knowledge, been the subject of one
study only. A recent study by Taghavi and colleagues (2006) comparing depressed
and anxious patients found some differences between types of irrational beliefs
between depressed and anxiety patients. Using the Irrational Beliefs Test as a
measure of irrationality, they found no difference between the two groups in 8 out of
10 of the subscales (demand approval [the need to be approved of and loved by all
the signiﬁcant people in one’s life], high self-expectation [believing one must be
thoroughly competent and adequate in all respects in order to be worthwhile], blame
proneness [people who behave badly are awful and should be punished severely],
frustrated reactivity [the idea that it is horrible if things are not as one would like],
anxious overconcern, problem avoidance, dependency and helplessness for change
[the idea that one is a helpless victim of the past]). However, emotional
irresponsibility and perfectionism were signiﬁcantly higher in the depressed group.
The relation between speciﬁc symptoms and the type of irrational beliefs has also
been the subject of study in student populations (Chang and D’Zurilla 1996;
Ciarrriochi 2004) as well as a community sample (Koopmans et al. 1994). The
study of Ciarriochi (2004) examined the differential relations of types of irrational
cognitions according to the Common Beliefs Survey-III with psychological
symptoms in a student population. This study revealed that stress symptoms were
best predicted by self-downing (the belief that one is worthless when not meeting
their own standards or making a mistake) and need for approval, anxiety symptoms
were best predicted by demanding perfection and need for approval, and ﬁnally
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and D’Zurilla (1996) used the Survey of Personal Beliefs and found that low
frustration tolerance was related to both anxiety and depressive symptoms. Other-
directed shoulds (inﬂexible demands of others) and self-worth however (negative
self-rating) were only related to anxiety symptoms. Awfulizing (overestimating the
seriousness of an event) and self-directed shoulds (inﬂexible self-demands) were not
related to either symptom. The study by Koopmans and colleagues (1994) found
higher correlations between worrying and need for approval measured by the
Irrational Beliefs Inventory and anxiety compared to the correlations of these
subscales with depressive symptoms. Correlations with the subscales emotional
irresponsibility and problem avoidance were similar for both types of symptoms.
Rigidity was not correlated to either depressive or anxiety symptoms.
The picture that arises from these clinical and non-clinical studies is not clear due
to use of different populations, different instruments to measure irrational beliefs
and different methods for the statistical analysis. The two irrational beliefs that are
linked to a speciﬁc symptom or disorder in more than one study are: need for
approval (anxiety) and emotional irresponsibility (depression). We argue that more
studies in clinical populations are needed to explore the presence of speciﬁc
irrational beliefs in different common mental disorders and to conﬁrm the speciﬁcity
of need for approval and emotional irresponsibility in anxiety and depression,
respectively.
We examined irrational beliefs as part of a longitudinal cohort study of workers
with common mental disorders. This enabled us to compare not only level and type
of irrational beliefs between diagnostic groups, but also the stability of these
features over time. Therefore, the ﬁrst aim of this study is to investigate differences
in level and type of irrational beliefs among a population of patients with
adjustment, depressive, or anxiety disorders. Differences in level and type will be
investigated using analysis of variance of total IBI-scores (level) and IBI-subscales
(type) at baseline and over time with diagnosis as between-subjects factor.
More knowledge on the association between changes in irrational beliefs and
changes in symptoms could provide important evidence for the basic premises of
REBT theory (David et al. 2005). Few studies have directly tested the REBT theory
of change. Intervention studies evaluating the efﬁcacy of REBT have found that
REBT leads to both symptom recovery and less irrational beliefs in patients with
social anxiety (Emmelkamp et al. 1985), obsessive–compulsive disorder (Emmelk-
amp and Beens 1991) and a mixed population of neurotic disorders (Lipsky et al.
1980). However, these studies had fairly small sample sizes (ranging from 31 to 50
patients). Moreover, these studies did not test whether the decrease in irrational
beliefs was related to the (magnitude of) decrease in symptoms. Such information
could further underpin the REBT theory of change. A review by Oei and Free
(1995) did ﬁnd that in their review of various treatments for depression that the
degree of change in irrational beliefs was related to the change in depression.
Although our cohort was not speciﬁcally treated with REBT, but its longitudinal
design and heterogeneous sample does provide an opportunity to examine the
association between changes in irrational beliefs and changes in various symptoms.
The second aim of this study is therefore to examine whether a change in irrational
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common mental disorders. We tested the hypothesis that the magnitude of the
change in irrational beliefs is related to the magnitude of symptom change by
comparing the symptom change in groups with different levels of change in
irrational beliefs over time.
Methods
Participants and Procedure
As part of a longitudinal cohort study of employees with mental health problems, 30
occupational physicians from nine occupational health services provided data on
consecutive patients. In order to include only new cases, eligible employees had to
have been on full sick leave for less than 6 weeks due to mental health problems.
Mental health problems were deﬁned as psychological symptoms which were not
caused by a somatic disorder. Any previous consultation with the occupational
physician had to be more than 3 months previously. All participants underwent
occupational rehabilitation provided by the occupational physician. According to
their clinical guidelines, these physicians are expected to assess psychological
symptoms and impairments of occupational functioning, evaluate whether treatment
in the curative sector is needed and/or effective, assess impediments in the return-
to-work process and carry out interventions aimed at the workplace or the
individual. An example of an intervention aimed at the workplace is providing
advice on a gradual return to work. The interventions aimed at the individual could
include making an inventory of problems and stressors and consequently of
solutions.
From March 2001 until February 2002, data on 277 employees eligible for
participation in this study were reported to us by the occupational physicians. Of
these 277 patients, 66 (24%) refused to participate. Of the remaining 211 employees
who signed an informed consent form, 198 ﬁlled out the baseline questionnaire. For
the purpose of this study, only data from participants with common mental disorders
(adjustment disorder, depression, anxiety disorder, or double diagnosis of depres-
sion and anxiety disorder) were used (n = 188).
Each participant was interviewed by the researchers by telephone. Subsequently,
four questionnaires were sent to the participants by mail at baseline (t0), three (t1),
six (t2) and 12 months (t3). One reminder was sent to each participant who did not
return the questionnaire within 2 weeks.
Measures
Diagnostic Interview
Participants were diagnosed by means of a telephone version of the structured
Composite International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI) (World Health Organization
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demonstrated comparability with face-to-face interviews (Simon et al. 1993; Rohde
et al. 1997; Fenig et al. 1993). The telephone interview included the following
diagnostic groups: major depressive disorder, panic disorder, social phobia,
somatoform disorder, bipolar disorder, obsessive–compulsive disorder, post-
traumatic stress disorder and psychotic disorder. For the ﬁrst three diagnoses we
administered the full CIDI scales, while we used only the stem (or screen) questions
for the other categories. It was allowed for a participant to meet the criteria for more
than one diagnosis. Anxiety disorder was operationalised as meeting the criteria for
one or more of the following disorders: panic disorder, social phobia, somatoform
disorder, obsessive–compulsive disorder, or post-traumatic stress disorder. Depres-
sion was operationalised as meeting the criteria for major depressive disorder. All
interviews were conducted or supervised by a mental health professional. All
interviews were tightly scripted and lasted 15–20 min.
Questionnaire
The baseline questionnaire provided information on age, gender, occupation (De
Zwart et al. 1997) and self-reported cause of mental health problems, while
irrational beliefs and symptoms were measured in all four questionnaires. The
Irrational Beliefs Inventory (IBI) is a 50-item measure of irrational beliefs,
comprising ﬁve subscales (Worrying, Rigidity, Need for Approval, Problem
Avoidance and Emotional Irresponsibility) and a total score (Koopmans et al.
1994). Each item is scored on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly
disagree)t o5( strongly agree). A high score reﬂects higher irrationality. Support
for satisfactory internal consistency, construct validity and sensitivity for change
was found (Koopmans et al. 1994; Emanuels-Zuurveen and Emmelkamp 1996).
The total score was used to assess level of irrationality, while the ﬁve subscales
provided information on the type of irrational beliefs that the participants
endorsed.
Psychological symptoms were measured using the DASS-42, which consists of
42 items divided into three subscales: Depression scale, Anxiety scale and Stress
scale (Lovibond and Lovibond 1993). Participants rated the extent to which they
had experienced each symptom over the previous week on a 4-point Likert scale
ranging from 0 (did not apply to me at all) to 3 (applied to me very much, or most of
the time). Internal consistency (Brown et al. 1997; Clara et al. 2001), construct
validity (Antony et al. 1998; Brown et al. 1997; Clara et al. 2001; Lovibond
and Lovibond 1995; Nieuwenhuijsen et al. 2003), convergent and divergent
validity (Antony et al. 1998; Brown et al. 1997; Lovibond and Lovibond 1995;
Nieuwenhuijsen et al. 2003) and criterion validity (Nieuwenhuijsen et al. 2003)o f
the DASS were satisfactory. Missing values within the subscales of the DASS were
imputed by the mean of the subscales if more than half of the items of that scale had
been ﬁlled in.
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At baseline, the internal consistency of the DASS subscales was high, with
Cronbach’s alpha’s of .94, .88 and .93 for the Depression, Anxiety and Stress
subscales, respectively. The internal consistencies of the IBI-subscale were
somewhat less favourable with .81 for IBI-worrying, .81 for IBI-Rigidity, .86 for
IBI-Need for Approval, .75 for IBI-problem avoidance and .77 for IBI-Emotional
Irresponsibility.
Employee Characteristics
Table 1 presents the characteristics of the employees who participated in the study.
Two of the original participants did not return any of the follow-up questionnaires
(lost to follow-up). Overall, 53 (7%) of the four questionnaires sent to each of the
remaining 186 participants were missing. The maximum of missing data per
subscale of the IBI and DASS was 18%. A non-response analysis revealed no
statistically signiﬁcant differences in gender, IBI-total score, DASS-Depression,
DASS-Anxiety and DASS-Stress scores at baseline between participants with and
without missing questionnaires. Compared to participants without missing ques-
tionnaires, participants with one or more questionnaires missing were signiﬁcantly
younger (mean age 40 years vs. 45 years; t = 3.2, p\0.05).
Gender differences in baseline IBI-scores were examined using one-way analysis
of variance (ANOVA) on IBI-total scores and IBI-subscales at baseline. This
analysis revealed that women showed statistically signiﬁcant higher scores on IBI-
worrying (mean 39.6 compared to men who had a mean score of 37.3;
F(1,179) = 5.8, p = 0.02) but not on any of the other subscales nor IBI-total score.
Table 1 Mean, standard
deviation (SD) or percentage of
gender, age, diagnosis,
occupation, and self-reported
cause of common mental
disorder. Due to missing values,
n ranges from 183 to 186
Participant characteristic % (n)
Gender, male 40 (74)
Age, mean (SD) 44.5 (8.5)
Diagnosis
Adjustment disorder 64 (120)
Depression 16 (30)
Anxiety disorder 12 (22)
Both anxiety disorder and depression
(double diagnosis)
8 (14)
Occupation
Mentally demanding (light and heavy) 44 (80)
Mixed mentally and physically demanding 53 (98)
Physically demanding (light and heavy) 3 (6)
Cause of common mental disorder
(self-reported), work-related
68 (125)
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Differences in Level of Irrationality between Diagnostic Groups
To examine the overall difference in level of IBI total scores, one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) was conducted on IBI scores at t0 between the four main
diagnostic groups; adjustment disorder, depression, anxiety disorder and double
diagnosis (both depression and anxiety disorder). This analysis revealed a main
effect of diagnostic group for IBI-total scores: (F(3,180) = 10.3, p\0.001),
indicating that the diagnostic groups had statistically different IBI-total scores at
baseline. As can be seen in Table 2, employees with a double diagnosis had the
highest mean IBI total scores, followed by employees with an anxiety disorder and
employees with a depression. Patients with adjustment disorders had the lowest
IBI-total scores.
Tukey post-hoc analysis indicated that the adjustment disorder group had
statistically signiﬁcant lower scores than either the anxiety disorder group
(p = 0.04) or the double diagnosis group (p\0.001). Furthermore, the depression
group scored signiﬁcantly lower than the double diagnosis group (p = 0.001).
To examine the stability in level of IBI total scores over time, one-way analysis
of variance with repeated measures (MANOVA) was conducted on IBI scores at t0
to t3 between the four main diagnostic groups; adjustment disorder, depression,
anxiety disorder and double diagnosis (both depression and anxiety disorder). This
analysis revealed a main effect of diagnostic group for IBI-total scores over time:
(F(3,441) = 11.92, p\0.0001). This indicates that the diagnostic groups had
statistically different IBI-total scores over time (Table 2). The mean scores of the
IBI-total scores over time reveal that, as was found at baseline, patients with a
double diagnosis had the highest IBI total scores, followed by employees with an
anxiety disorder and employees with a depression. Employees with adjustment
disorders had the lowest IBI-total scores. No statistically signiﬁcant time 9 diag-
nosis interaction effect was found (F(9,441) = 0.62, p = 0.78), indicating that the
change in IBI-total scores over time was similar in all diagnostic groups (Fig. 1).
Tukey post-hoc analysis showed that the adjustment disorder group had
statistically signiﬁcant lower mean IBI total scores over time than either the
anxiety disorder group (p = 0.046) or the double diagnosis group (p\0.0001). The
difference between the adjustment disorder and the depression group was not
statistically signiﬁcant (p = 0.21). Furthermore, the difference between the
depression group and the double diagnosis was statistically signiﬁcant (p = 0.03).
The differences in mean IBI-total scores over time between the anxiety disorder
group on one hand and the depression group and the double diagnosis group on the
other were both not statistically signiﬁcant (p = 0.90 and p = 0.16, respectively).
Differences in Type of Irrational Beliefs between Diagnostic Groups
To subsequently test the overall difference in type of irrational beliefs at t0 between
the diagnostic groups, Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) of the
64 K. Nieuwenhuijsen et al.
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123IBI-subscale scores with diagnosis as between-subjects factor was conducted. This
analysis showed an overall main effect of diagnosis (F(15,534) = 2.6, p = 0.001).
This indicates that patients from the diagnostic groups differed in their scores on the
IBI-subscales at baseline (Table 2). Furthermore, this analysis yielded signiﬁcant
univariate main effects of diagnosis for IBI-Worrying (F(3,180) = 7.3, p\0.001),
IBI-Rigidity (F(3,180) = 4.0, p = 0.009), IBI-Need for Approval (F(3,180) = 3.8,
p = 0.01) and IBI-Problem Avoidance (F(3,180) = 3.8, p = 0.01).
The double diagnosis group had the highest scores on the IBI-worrying subscale.
The post-hoc analyses revealed that the mean scores in this subgroup were
statistically signiﬁcantly higher than those of the adjustment disorder group
(p B 0.0001) and the depression group (p = 0.02) but not signiﬁcantly higher than
the anxiety group (p = 0.56). The difference in means of the anxiety disorder group
compared to other diagnostic groups was not statistically signiﬁcant. The mean
score of the depression group did also not differ signiﬁcantly from the other
diagnostic subgroups apart from the double diagnosis group.
The double diagnosis group had the highest scores on the IBI-rigidity subscale.
Post-hoc analyses revealed that the difference of this diagnostic group with all other
diagnostic groups was statistically signiﬁcant (p-values ranging from 0.01 to 0.02).
Among these other diagnostic groups no statistically signiﬁcant differences were
found.
The double diagnosis group also had the highest scores on the IBI-Need for
Approval, IBI-Problem Avoidance and on the IBI-Emotional irresponsibility
subscale. The post-hoc analyses revealed that, for these subscales, the mean
scores in this group did not statistically differ from any other diagnostic group.
Nor were statistically signiﬁcant differences found among those other diagnostic
groups.
Stability over time of type of irrational beliefs was tested using MANOVAs, with
repeated measurements of IBI-subscale scores with diagnosis as between-subjects
IBI-total
120
125
130
135
140
145
150
155
160
165
170
Baseline
Adjustment disorder
Depression
Anxiety disorder
Anxiety disorder & Depression
12 months 6 months 3 months
Fig. 1 Mean IBI-total scores at t0, t1, t2, and t3 for the four diagnostic groups. n = 151 due to missing
values
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123factor and time as the within-subject factor. The MANOVA revealed statistically
signiﬁcant main effects for time in the following subscales: IBI-Worrying
(F(3,447) = 12.1, p\0.0001), IBI-Need for Approval (F(3,444) = 7.1,
p\0.0001), IBI-Problem Avoidance (F(3,444) = 4.0, p = 0.008) and IBI-Emo-
tional Irresponsibility (F(3,441) = 3.2, p = 0.02). As can also be seen in Table 2,
this main effect over time is due to a decrease over time in the scores on these
subscales. For the subscale IBI-Rigidity such a signiﬁcant main effect was not found
(F(3,444) = 0.7, p = 0.57), the scores on this subscale appear stable over time
(Table 2).
A statistically signiﬁcant interaction effect of diagnosis and time was found for
IBI-Emotional irresponsibility. Tukey post-hoc analysis showed that this effect was
due to a statistically signiﬁcant difference between the adjustment disorder group and
the double diagnosis group (p = 0.03). As can be seen in Table 2, the mean scores in
the double diagnosis group ﬁrst show an increase before they decrease compared to
baseline level. For all other subscales, no statistically signiﬁcant interaction effect of
diagnosis and time was found. This suggests that the decrease over time for these
types of irrational beliefs is the same for the four diagnostic groups.
Relation between Change in Irrational Beliefs and Symptom Recovery
In order to describe the relation between change in irrationality and symptom
recovery, employees were classiﬁed into three groups based upon their change in
IBI total score between t0 and t3. Subsequently, overall differences of these groups
on the three DASS-subscales at t0, t1, t2 and t3 were examined with three separate
repeated measurements MANOVAs. IBI change group was used as between-
subjects factor and time as within-subject factor. The three IBI-change groups,
based on the tertile scores, differed substantially in their mean change in IBI-total
score, while no statistically signiﬁcant differences were observed between IBI-total
scores at baseline (F(2,154) = 2.7, p = 0.07). The ﬁrst group had a mean increase
of 6.0 (IBI-increase group), the second group showed a mean decrease of 7.7
(IBI-small decrease group) and the third group was found to have a mean decrease
of 22.2 (IBI-substantial decrease group). A time by IBI-change group interaction
effect was statistically signiﬁcant for depressive (F(6,294) = 3.4, p = 0.003),
anxiety (F(6, 294) = 2.4, p = 0.03) and stress symptoms (F(6,314) = 3.7,
p = 0.001). The IBI-increase group showed the smallest reduction in depression,
anxiety and stress symptom levels followed by the IBI-small decrease group
(Fig. 2). The IBI-substantial decrease group had the largest reduction in symptom
levels over time. This means that a change in irrational beliefs is related to the
magnitude of symptom recovery.
Discussion
This study showed that employees with both a depression and an anxiety disorder
have the highest level of irrational beliefs, followed by employees with only anxiety
68 K. Nieuwenhuijsen et al.
123disorders. This effect remains over the course of one year. Employees with a
depression had lower levels of irrationality than employees with anxiety disorders,
but higher levels than the group with adjustment disorders. This is in line with the
DASS-Depression
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Fig. 2 Mean scores of DASS subscales at t0, t1, t2, and t3 for three IBI-change groups. n = 151 due to
missing values
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123expectation that patients with more severe diagnoses within the group of common
mental disorders endorse higher levels of irrational beliefs. The ﬁnding of higher
levels of irrationality in patients with anxiety disorders compared to depressive
symptoms was somewhat surprising. Chang and Bridewell (1998) found that higher
levels of irrational beliefs were more related to depressive then to anxiety symptoms
in their student population.
In contrast to our expectations, we did not ﬁnd any type of irrational belief as
being most pronounced in certain disorders. The double diagnosis group had higher
scores than the other diagnostic groups on all subscales. The ﬁnding of Taghavi and
colleagues (2006) and Koopmans and colleagues (1994) that emotional irrespon-
sibility is speciﬁc for depression was not corroborated. Nor was the speciﬁcity of
need for approval in anxiety (Koopmans et al. 1994; Ciarriochi 2004). However,
future studies should reveal whether the IBI questionnaire is inappropriate for
measuring disorder-speciﬁc beliefs, or whether the diagnostic groups differ only in
level of irrationality.
The longitudinal design of this study provided the means for an examination of
the course of irrationality. As in earlier studies on depression alone, change in
irrational cognitions was associated with change in symptoms (Oei and Free 1995).
Although it is not a direct test of the REBT theory of change it does substantiate the
assumption that symptom change is mediated by a change in irrationality.
We found that participants with an increase in IBI-scores over 12 months had the
smallest reduction in symptoms and that participants who had a decrease in their
level of irrational beliefs over 12 months had the largest reduction. However, if
irrational beliefs are responsible for a decrease in symptoms, one would have
expected that in a group with participants experiencing an increase in irrational
beliefs, the symptom levels would have increased as well. One possible explanation
for this unexpected ﬁnding is that such an increase of symptoms occurred at a time
point later than our last measurement. As for now the question whether a decrease in
irrationality precedes symptom recovery remains unanswered. It has been argued
that irrational cognitions and symptoms are both inﬂuenced by an unknown
common cause (Burns and Spangler 2001). In future research, structural equation
modelling might be used to thoroughly investigate the temporal relationship
between beliefs and symptoms.
Our group of patients with adjustment disorders had a level of irrational beliefs
(mean IBI-total score 140.6) comparable to those found in a community sample
(mean score 140.9) in a previous study (Koopmans et al. 1994). The level of
irrationality in the other diagnostic groups was higher. This is in agreement with the
notion that anxiety disorders and depression are considered more severe disorders
than adjustment disorders (Casey et al. 2001). At follow-up (T3), patients from the
adjustment disorder group had even lower levels of irrationality (mean score 132.4)
than normal controls. Participants with an anxiety disorder or a double diagnosis
had irrationality scores higher than normal controls at follow-up (144.2 and 154.1,
respectively). This could mean that they had not yet recovered sufﬁciently. Another
explanation is that these patients had a stable tendency to have irrational beliefs,
which made them prone to relapse.
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123In conclusion, groups with different diagnoses differed more in level of
irrationality than in type of irrational beliefs and this effect was found at baseline
and over the course of one year. Depression and anxiety disorders showed higher
levels of irrationality than adjustment disorders. Furthermore, the whole group
showed a decrease in irrational beliefs over time, while no differential effects for
diagnosis were found. In accordance with expectations, the magnitude and direction
of change in irrationality was associated with the magnitude of symptom recovery.
These ﬁndings suggest that CBT may encompass similar cognitive interventions for
all common mental disorders. Furthermore, cognitive interventions seem to be most
appropriate for patients with depression and anxiety disorders. To a certain extent,
the association between changes in irrational beliefs and symptoms supports the use
of cognitive interventions in CBT. A challenging task for future research will be to
answer the question of whether a decrease in irrational beliefs is a prerequisite for
symptom recovery.
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